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WINNSBORO, S. C.

# *Cornwallis*

THE

*American Adventure*

*Franklin and Mary*

**WICKWIRE**

*Illustrated with Photographs and Maps*

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY BOSTON

1970

wagons along. The horses were too exhausted to pull their loads by the time they got to Sugar Creek, one of the first of many streams that challenged the army. Militia served for draft animals and struggled through the icy water drawing their heavy loads.<sup>22</sup> All the while, rebels sniped and harassed the rear and flanks of the army.

But if the men who could walk suffered terribly, the sick men who jounced along in the wagons endured nightmares of agony. Major Hanger, wounded at Charlotte, fell an easy prey to the fever which prostrated him at the time that Tarleton recovered. When the army moved out from Charlotte, rough hands piled Hanger and five other officers suffering from the same illness — “yellow fever” Hanger called it — into wagons. The others died within the week and were buried along the route of march. Hanger himself barely survived. The rains had so swollen the innumerable streams (normally ankle-deep) which barred the army’s way that water reached above the axles of the wagons. Many times water soaked the straw on which Hanger lay in his cart. The rough journey reduced the major to “something very like a skeleton.” The bones of his back and hip even protruded through his skin, and he became so weak he could not turn himself over. Since the army had so little to eat he sustained himself on opium and port wine.<sup>23</sup> The Earl suffered similar privations, although fever never laid him so low as Hanger, and he recovered soon after the army reached Winnsboro on October 29. In a sense, the suffering of their leader and other officers heartened the army. Soldiers bore their hardships without a murmur. “Their attachment to their commander,” Stedman observed, “supported them in the day of adversity; knowing as they did, that their officers; and even lords Cornwallis and Rawdon’s fare was not better than their own.”<sup>24</sup>

At Winnsboro, the consequences of Ferguson’s defeat intruded themselves even more forcefully upon the Earl’s atten-

tion, for nothing now went right for him, even in South Carolina. Between November 1 and the end of the year he saw every element of his forces — regulars, provincials, and the only loyalist militia he had ever counted upon — beaten, not by American regulars, but by patriot militia.

First to fall were the “invincible” British regulars. In an effort to retrieve the initiative, Cornwallis dispatched on horseback one hundred thirty-five regular infantry from the 63d and about forty Legion cavalry under the command of Major James Weymss to surprise General Thomas Sumter, who was operating in the vicinity of Camden under orders from Gates. Weymss eventually caught up with the “Gamecock” at Fishdam Ford on the Broad River, where the British estimated that their enemy bivouacked between four and nine hundred men. These were long odds for Weymss’ two hundred, but the British needed a striking success if they hoped to recover their position, and Weymss thirsted for a chance at the pesky partisan. He reached the ford about one o’clock in the early morning hours of November 9. Sumter, sensing danger, had sensibly posted his men to avoid just such a surprise as Weymss planned. Forgetting he was an infantry officer, the 63d’s leader galloped into the attack at the head of dragoons. Sumter’s pickets knocked him off his horse with their first five shots. Cavalry nonetheless continued to charge and drove Sumter’s right wing toward the Broad River. But the charge led Weymss’ men into the rest of the Gamecock’s army, which, from its positions in swamps and hills to the front and right of the British detachment, poured in a withering fire. The 63d stopped, dismounted, and began to return fire. At this point Lieutenant John Stark, who took command when Weymss fell, decided to break off the action. He knew neither the ground nor the enemy’s strength, and he had not formulated a tactical plan. He only knew that deadly rifle fire poured in on his men, so he retreated. He left his disabled commander in a cabin with other British wounded where Sumter, who had

barely escaped with his life by jumping a fence and running through a briar patch, found them the next day. Cornwallis, who learned on the tenth of this reverse, barely contained his anger as the truth of the battle filtered in. He learned from the sergeant major of the 63d — who had been left with a flag of truce — that daylight had revealed a deserted field. The enemy only ventured to the cabin two hours after dawn and picked up Major Weymss and the other wounded. Had the inexperienced Stark remained and fought it out, he might have brought a badly needed victory to British arms.<sup>25</sup>

Tarleton had been trying vainly to catch the elusive Francis Marion. Now it was up to him to stop the equally elusive Sumter. The Legion tore off to avenge Weymss. Tarleton gathered up elements of the 63d regiment and the 71st at Brierly's Ferry on the Broad to beef up his forces. Sumter also increased his own numbers to around a thousand men when he added some Georgians he had encountered. Tarleton probably hoped to push the Gamecock toward Cruger's post at Ninety-Six and crush him between the two British forces. Sumter, however, did not wish to be pushed, and he drew up his militia at Blackstock's Plantation on the steep hills above the Tiger River during the afternoon of November 22. In his haste to catch Sumter, who he feared would cross the Tiger before dark, Tarleton left behind the infantry of the 71st and the artillery, and hurried on with his Legion and mounted infantry of the 63d. But when he reached Blackstock's he hesitated to attack. Sumter had placed his main force in thick woods on the hills above and to the left of the road along which Tarleton advanced, and a group of riflemen in the plantation outbuildings to the right of the road. Tarleton only had about three hundred men and no artillery to face a thousand — odds which daunted even his foolhardy spirit. Sumter, however, took the situation out of his hands. He advanced four hundred men against the 63d, who had dismounted, on Tarleton's right. The regulars chased the militia back, but

back too far, for the 63d ran into a withering fire from men in the plantation buildings. At roughly the same time Sumter sent another group against the flank of the dragoons idly watching the action of the 63d. The Gamecock's men opened up on Tarleton's horsemen from seventy-five yards with buckshot. Twenty dragoons fell from their saddles. The Legion commander hastily decided a charge would save the 63d, and he led his riders forward to rescue the infantry. The dragoons managed to cover the withdrawal of the redcoat foot soldiers — a withdrawal that saved the day. During their retreat, a platoon of the 63d levelled their muskets at an American officer and fired. They wounded Thomas Sumter.

Tarleton withdrew to wait for his infantry and artillery in hopes of renewing the attack the next day, but Sumter's militia, disheartened by the fall of their chief, melted away during the night. The next day Tarleton lied to Cornwallis, claiming a victory where none existed. He excused his failure to pursue the "defeated" enemy by citing his lack of infantry (which must have struck Cornwallis as a curious device for falling upon a routed foe), the difficult nature of the ground, and the coming of nightfall. Lacking other information, Cornwallis had to believe Tarleton's claim to victory. Yet even this "victory" could not encourage the Earl. For Tarleton also wrote that Sumter had hurt him severely and that his numerous wounded inhibited the effectiveness of his force. The best he offered Cornwallis after the bout with Sumter was the information that he had promised three young men fifty guineas if they could find and "fix" the disabled Sumter.<sup>26</sup> Tarleton, in fact, had been defeated, and if the Earl did not realize it at the time, if indeed he could still sing his Legionnaire's praises to Clinton on December 3,<sup>27</sup> he found the "victory" had in no way recovered the ground lost at King's Mountain.

Blackstock's proved more than just a check to Tarleton. It brought a deep, personal loss to Cornwallis who had grown

fond, perhaps overly fond, of his young aide-de-camp, Lieutenant John Money. He had come to treat the lieutenant as a father might treat his son rather than as a commanding general usually treated a subordinate.<sup>28</sup> Money went with the 63d to Blackstock's and never returned. He was wounded severely in the infantry charge against the plantation outbuildings. Tarleton barely managed to scoop him up and return him to the British lines. When Cornwallis heard what had happened he ordered his officers to take the strictest care of his aide and to report constantly on the state of his health. Despite their efforts, the young lieutenant died during the evening of December 1.<sup>29</sup>

Money's death plunged Cornwallis into a gloom not relieved by the bad news he received regarding Colonel Henry Rugeley. This militia colonel managed to fill the Earl's cup of bitterness to overflowing. Although by December Cornwallis had come to expect little from militia, he still at least hoped that when armed, entrenched, not outnumbered, and within ten miles of solid support from a regular army, they might hold their own. Rugeley proved they could not. He owned a mill about eight miles from Camden. Gates had camped there before his big defeat. The mill was on a creek, named Granny's Quarter (or Granny Quarter or Graney Quarter), noticeable, in a country of muddy-looking streams colored by red clay, for its delightfully clear, sparkling water. On a hill above the creek Rugeley had constructed a blockhouse of strong logs pierced with loopholes, with a platform inside for an "upper tier of musquetry." He had also thrown earth around the outside and surrounded his position with abatis. "In short, it was a Post that ought not to have been touched without cannon." Thus fortified, Rugeley dared the enemy, led by Colonel William Washington, to do its worst. The enemy did. Washington fashioned the likeness of a cannon from a tree trunk, "advanced suddenly" to the blockhouse, and demanded submission. Although aid was but a short distance away and Rugeley was in constant touch with Rawdon's

forces at Camden, the loyalist colonel felt more discreet than valorous and surrendered without firing a shot.<sup>30</sup>

Rugeley's disgrace merely emphasized what Cornwallis had already openly acknowledged — the final defeat of his plans for 1780 — and this occurred despite the fact that Clinton had at last dispatched Major General Leslie toward the Cape Fear River for the diversion Cornwallis had requested. But on the day before Blackstock's, Cornwallis had admitted the insecurity of his position by sending for Leslie's force. He ordered the major general to Charleston, whence he could move up to join the Earl's forces.<sup>31</sup>

Although Cornwallis would bivouac at Winnsboro to husband the strength of his regulars and although Leslie's reinforcement would eventually reach him, never again in the Carolinas would he be so strong as before King's Mountain. Never again would the militia serve in such numbers and with the same degree of effectiveness as they had before Ferguson's costly engagement. After King's Mountain every element of Britain's forces — regulars, provincials, and militia — was beaten. Only the Earl's main army remained undefeated. It would indeed never be defeated in battle in the open field. But it was too small to restore the South to Britain. King's Mountain marked the beginning of the end of the British Empire in the South.

To what extent was Cornwallis to blame for this misfortune? As the commanding general in the South, he, of course, held ultimate responsibility. Clinton charged later that his subordinate's exercise of that responsibility led to disaster. Yet Sir Henry apparently failed to examine the facts. First of all, Clinton asserted that Cornwallis knew as early as September 6 that Ferguson was in trouble. Since the "backwater boys" did not even gather at Sycamore Shoals until September 25 in response to Ferguson's very success, Cornwallis must have been a prophet to realize the Scotsman's danger so early.

Sir Henry also averred that it was the Earl's "too great par-

tiality to detachment by which he was often liable to be beat in detail, and to avoid little affronts he often risked great ones. That he trusted the Militia by themselves without support, & lost Ferguson . . . and as his Ldship risked him contrary to his own experience, and that of the Army, he alone is answerable." <sup>32</sup> Once again, Clinton failed to examine all the evidence. True, Ferguson's men were unsupported militia, but so were the men who beat him. The very fact that no American army was available in any numbers to oppose the Scotsman had enabled the Earl to send him off independently in the first place. Indeed, in terms of regulars, Ferguson had the advantage at King's Mountain with his one hundred provincials. The numbers engaged were roughly equal, and the Earl had every right to expect that at roughly equal numbers a regular British army major, supported by one hundred provincials and commanding the best of the South Carolina militia, could beat any combination of patriot irregulars.

Furthermore, Sir Henry had his facts wrong. Ferguson first told the Earl of his troubles on September 28. On September 30 and again on October 3, 5, and 6, Ferguson dispatched messages to Cornwallis. The Earl received the letters of September 28 and 30 on October 5. He immediately ordered Ferguson to march to Armer's Ford on the Catawba to the southeast of Charlotte, there to meet Major Archibald McArthur. At the same time he ordered McArthur to take the 1st battalion of the 71st regiment from the Waxhaws to reinforce Ferguson at the ford. He further enjoined Ferguson not to fight but merely to gather intelligence. The Scotsman had not received these instructions on October 3 when he intimated to his commander that he intended to stand and fight. Cornwallis received this distressing news on October 6 and again wrote his subordinate not to give battle but to march where relief awaited him. That Ferguson received Cornwallis' letter of the fifth and willfully chose to disregard the orders contained in it is suggested by his dispatch of

October 6 expressing the hope that His Lordship would not supersede him with a superior officer.<sup>33</sup> Ferguson must have referred to McArthur, whose commission as major predated his own by two years. But whether or not the Scotsman ever received any of Cornwallis' orders, the British commander acted as soon as he received information of his subordinate's difficulties.

Tarleton, in a vindictive mood after the war, published an account of the southern campaign which blamed Cornwallis for not sending the Legion to rescue Ferguson. But Tarleton's charge was false. An officer of the 71st, Roderick Mackenzie, expressly repudiated it in a publication attacking Tarleton.<sup>34</sup> Cornwallis also repudiated it in a private letter to his brother, the Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry. In this letter Cornwallis emphasized that he had ordered Ferguson not to engage (which contemporary evidence overwhelmingly supports) and that he *had* ordered, indeed entreated, Tarleton to march to Ferguson's relief. Tarleton, the Earl said, had "pleaded weakness from the remains of a fever [the one he had contracted during the march to Charlotte], and refused to make the attempt."<sup>35</sup> That Cornwallis may well have ordered Tarleton to march as soon as he felt able is attested by the Earl's letter to Ferguson of October 6. "Tarleton shall pass at some of the upper fords," it said, "and clear the country; for the present both he and his corps want a few days rest."<sup>36</sup>

Cornwallis erred in judgment several times during the Revolution but not in his arrangements for marching into North Carolina in 1780. Through no fault of his own, a man whom he had not appointed led a military force into an engagement that he had expressly ordered it to avoid. Now, back in South Carolina, the disastrous consequences of that battle weighed heavily on his shoulders. As Cornwallis settled down at Winnsboro, the Carolina winter promised to be bleaker than usual.

## CHAPTER 11

### *Winter at Winnsboro*

THE GHASTLY MARCH from Charlotte to Winnsboro was an omen, had Cornwallis but known it, of what lay in store for his army during the next months in the Carolinas. After his tactical losses in numerous small engagements, winter seemed to bring even more trouble and from all sides. The many logistical problems which, in the flush of victory, the Earl had tossed aside at Camden for his tramp north now came crowding back upon him at Winnsboro. He hoped that the prolonged bivouac at Winnsboro would refresh his army, allow supplies to catch up with it, and enable his sick to convalesce. He also hoped to use the breathing spell to establish firmer communications and to improve his intelligence service. Instead, at Winnsboro his men barely survived, his sick increased, his communications worsened, and his hitherto-superb intelligence service collapsed. In 1781 he thought his troops sufficiently recovered to renew the offensive, but he did not conceive of the conditions they would face. The chase after Greene in February made the retreat from Charlotte the previous October seem like a Sunday hike. Had the Earl taken the lessons of Winnsboro to heart, Greene might not have been able to lead him a country dance.

Cornwallis encamped his troops at Winnsboro during November and December on a gently sloping plain above the town (now the present school grounds). For winter shelter, he had his men construct log houses cemented by mud — dwellings perhaps not dissimilar to those of Washington's men at Valley Forge. He himself lived at least part of the time in one of these cabins.<sup>1</sup> Pouring over his returns by candlelight, bemoaning his sick list, cursing his lack of intelligence, he had much to think about during that winter. The commander in chief of the South, reduced to living in a log cabin, discovered all too quickly that logistical problems defied easy solutions.

His most pressing need was wagons and horses. Even if the countryside had always supplied ample food (which it did not) and even if numerous British provision ships had reached Charleston bountifully laden with arms, ammunition, uniforms, and accoutrements (which they did not), he would still have needed wagons and horses, in vast numbers, to transport the goods to his army. During his entire period in South Carolina, Cornwallis never found enough of both items simultaneously. "We have plenty of waggons, but the situation of the horses & gear is wretched beyond description." "We are ordered to collect forage, corn and fuel. . . . Unless more carriages can be got we shall be much distressed." "Upon the most accurate account I can get of our strength in waggons, I find it will be quite impracticable to go near supplying you with rum, salt, & carrying up the necessaries sent for." "Waggons were so scarce in these parts that the corn which was promised us, could not be brought to the mill."<sup>2</sup> So the complaints went from August of 1780 to January of 1781. On January 7, as he prepared to leave South Carolina, Cornwallis wrote: "By the great assiduity of Philips and his militia & the fortunate arrival of some country waggons, I am enabled to move tomorrow not without leaving a quantity of meal behind."<sup>3</sup> After a winter of trying to refit and refurbish his army with a permanent, efficient transportation

service in anticipation of a long, hard campaign against a clever foe, only the opportune arrival of a few country wagons enabled him to open the offensive. Even then he could not carry enough food for his army.

His perennial shortages owed as much to Sir Henry Clinton and to the army system itself as to his own failings. When Sir Henry left for New York in June he took most of the wagons back with him.<sup>4</sup> Since the suppression of the mounted, swiftly moving, patriot guerrillas depended upon equal mobility in the British army, Clinton's selfish, or thoughtless, action hamstrung the Earl from the very start of his Carolina campaign. So did the army's administrative system. In all theaters of the war at this time, the quartermaster general's department held primary responsibility for furnishing the army with wagons. But such a service under his control, hiring wagons on long-term contracts — reasonable in theory — degenerated, in practice, into a profiteering racket. Primarily because of the venality of the quartermaster general's officers, the annual cost of the wagon service in America was outrageous, perhaps as high as £145,000. These officers had quickly discovered that they could make enormous profits by owning wagons and horses which they could in turn hire at exorbitant prices for the use of the army. No law specified which wagons or horses the quartermaster general must hire, so his deputies hired their own. "His Trust and Interest draw opposite ways," as a parliamentary investigation later noted.<sup>5</sup>

In South Carolina the quartermaster general's men added some embellishments of their own. They, of course, continued to profit financially.<sup>6</sup> In addition, they often pressed wagons and horses needlessly, kept them from service at times when the Earl needed them most, and alienated the loyalists unnecessarily.<sup>7</sup> Such erratic behavior undoubtedly delayed the march to Charlotte. And, even if the department did find enough horses at the beginning of the return from Charlotte, it lost many on the

march through the stupid ingratitude and haughtiness of its own officers. As Cornwallis lay ill, bumping along uncomfortably toward Winnsboro, only the exertions of loyalist militia kept the army wagons moving. The terrible trip frequently exhausted the wagon and artillery horses, and when they reached Sugar Creek the over-driven creatures could not pull their loads across the slippery clay bottom and up the nearly perpendicular banks. So the militia unhitched the horses from some of the wagons and got into the harnesses themselves. "In return for the exertions," Commissary Stedman observed, "the militia were maltreated, by abusive language, and even beaten by some officers in the quarter-master general's department." As a result, "several of them left the army next morning, forever, chusing to run the risque of meeting the resentment of their enemies rather than submit to the derision and abuse of those to whom they looked up as friends."<sup>8</sup> Of course they took their horses with them.

At Winnsboro the troublesome department continued its tricks, and Cornwallis tried — in vain — first to thwart it and then to bend it to his will. Finally, he resolved at least to deprive it of its profits and force it to a strict accounting. To do so, he attempted circumvention. "I hope," he told Balfour, "by getting rid of everybody belonging to the Qr. Mr. Genl's department, & by paying conductors, drivers &c their wages, instead of putting them into our own pockets, to procure a sufficient provision train to enable us to subsist."<sup>9</sup> In November, however, he returned management to the department when he appointed Major England, a subordinate whom he thought he could trust, as his deputy quartermaster general. "England has great merit," the Earl remarked, "& considering all the difficulties and hardships his waggons & horses are in wonderful good order. His thoughts are taken up with supplying the army, & not making money, which is the only object of all the departments."<sup>10</sup> But whether because England let him down or because England's

men proved intractable, in December Cornwallis yet again found it necessary to deal severely with the quartermaster general's department. He directed "that the Quarter Master General should have no Property in either the Waggon or the Horses." He further issued a public proclamation on the twenty-third which demanded strict accounting:

As I consider myself a Steward for the Public Money expended by the Troops under my Command, I think myself bound, by the Duty I owe my Country, to regulate the Charges to be made by the different Departments.

The Quartermaster General must absolutely be restricted from charging more for Waggon and Horses than he has actually paid, for which he must produce his Vouchers; and he is not to charge the hire of Horses and Waggon purchased; nor is he to purchase either Horses or Waggon but upon Government Account. If the Necessity of the Service should oblige him to hire Waggon and Horses in the Country, either to attend the Army, or to carry Supplies to the different Posts, he is to pay the Proprietors the full Price allowed by Government for the Hire of such Waggon, for which the Receipts of such Proprietors will be his Vouchers.<sup>11</sup>

Yet despite all these measures, Cornwallis never could bring the quartermaster's office to heel. In January of 1781 as he prepared to open his campaign against Greene, the quartermaster general's officers presented to him a final absurd effrontery. While the commissaries of the British general were provisioning some wagons against the anticipated demands of the coming months, Tarleton's quartermaster came upon them, interrupted their work, and took their wagons. "In vain the commissaries represented that they were the waggon of the army," the Earl later fumed to Tarleton, "employed by my order in the public service. He [Tarleton's quartermaster] swore he did not care, that he had Col. Tarleton's orders to press waggon & he would have them & appealed to the *ratio ultima* of the broad sword."




Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum.

JEMIMA, COUNTESS CORNWALLIS

Mezzotint by James Watson,  
after Sir Joshua Reynolds





## SURRENDER OF BRITISH STANDARDS AT YORKTOWN

*Engraving from Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution,  
by B. J. Lossing*

Cornwallis presumed that the quartermaster acted without Tarleton's knowledge, but he ordered the Legion commander to deal with the man "severely" or the "conducting this army through the country will be impracticable." The Earl later discovered that the Legion quartermaster had used the wagons to haul a "fork load of forage" to a plantation.<sup>12</sup>

Such incidents drove Cornwallis very nearly to despair, yet he could not prevent them. He as much as admitted defeat to Balfour: "I fear at last I shall be foiled," he wrote, "at least as far as the So. Carolina waggons. For unless I had a person I could depend on to purchase the Qr. Mr. Genl's waggons & horses & to take care of them afterwards, I fear he would take very effectual methods to prevent my economy being admired."<sup>13</sup>

So great was the Earl's dissatisfaction with the quartermaster general's department that he took his grievances to the chambers of Parliament after the war.<sup>14</sup> But part of his difficulties in organizing the transportation service owed neither to Sir Henry Clinton nor to the quartermaster general. They related, instead, to the larger problem of supply. Even had the quartermaster general's men been models of impeccable virtue, they still could not have furnished adequate transportation without first finding a sufficient supply of horses. South Carolina had no lack of these animals. Patriot militia were effective chiefly because they were always mounted. Yet although horses in plenty roamed the Carolina meadows, the British army rarely shared in the abundance. Its methods of procurement worked against its interest. Basically, of course, the army had two sources of supply: the loyalists and the patriots. From the one they should buy, from the other take. But they often took as much from their friends as they did from their enemies. Stedman described the South Carolina militia as "in general faithless, and altogether dissatisfied in the British service." He considered the quartermaster general and the cavalry mainly responsible, for

these two units of the army constantly pressed loyalist horses. There was perhaps a reason for their actions: loyalist horses might be easier to come by than patriot ones. Loyalists might openly parade their possessions in the presence of redcoat regulars, while patriots hid theirs. His Majesty's army, however, could depend upon loyalist naïveté for only a brief period. Word soon spread, and the King's friends grew as wary as his enemies.

The British did institute a method of payment but one so inequitable that few men received full value for their goods. When the Carolinians learned that British "purchase" deprived them of their property as surely as British confiscation, they became increasingly loathe to sell. As Cornwallis' army took horses it gave most of the former owners certificates, evidence that their property now served King George and that they ought to be reimbursed. But reimbursement often depended upon contingencies. Desperate loyalists, in need of money, often sold these certificates at a tremendous discount to speculators. Only rarely did the army give receipts which guaranteed the owners payment upon presentation at Charleston. Receipts, however, listed only the property taken, not its value. A man would not often venture a trip to Charleston to recover the value of his property if the trip cost as much as the property taken and if that property consisted of horses which he would need for the journey in the first place. Furthermore, once in the city he had no guarantee that the British army would reimburse him to the full value of his loss.

The injustice of the system probably prompted men to hide their horses from the British army while it was at Winnsboro, for Cornwallis altered his methods after he left winter quarters. He anticipated, of course, that he would require more horses for his moving army than for his bivouacked one, and the old arrangement did not promise to answer his needs. So he ordered that in the future, receipts must specify not only the property

taken but also its value. He thus bestowed upon the slip of paper a "negotiable authority." His subordinates continued to issue the old certificates to men of doubtful allegiance, but the Earl intended for the new receipts to go to the truly loyal in the hope that they would grow less reluctant to part with their property for the cause. Unfortunately, commissaries thwarted Cornwallis' purpose, for they rarely issued the receipts. Horses continued to be sorely needed.<sup>15</sup>

But even if the commissaries had found thousands of healthy steeds for the army, they would have solved only a part of the supply problems. Greater and more constant than his need for horses was his need for food. While he always seemed to find enough to satisfy his day-to-day needs, he could never store a bountiful surplus against contingencies. His army never actually starved to death in South Carolina, but it rarely knew whether to expect feast or famine from one day to the next. In a province that produced wheat, corn, and rice in quantities, Cornwallis subsisted only with difficulty.

But he did subsist. After he returned from Charlotte he sent Rawdon to command the forces at Camden, while he retained charge of the men at Winnsboro. Both parts of the army gathered food from the country between the two towns and south of them. Charles Stedman exerted himself mightily to collect provisions. He daily attended several mills, some of them six miles apart, and to keep them producing he used one hundred twenty Negroes, a sergeant of the 71st regiment, one cooper, and four overseers. By his own estimate, his efforts enabled the army to open its campaign in January of 1781 with "50,000 weight" of meal packed and ready for use.<sup>16</sup>

Stedman used methods far from gentle, and by stripping the countryside he alienated friends and hardened the resistance of foes. As a result, when Cornwallis went in pursuit of Greene, the troops he left to garrison South Carolina — who outnumbered the force he took with him — would face even greater

difficulty in finding victuals than when he had been at Winnsboro. The country would feed them less and less adequately.

Cornwallis was caught in a terrible dilemma during that winter of 1780 to 1781. He had no wish to be ruthless at Winnsboro, yet he had to feed his army. Dr. David Ramsay, the patriot who in the 1780's wrote a history of the Revolution in South Carolina, accused Stedman of seizing provisions from helpless people and of cheating the British by charging the army for what he had obtained by robbery. Although Stedman hotly denied the accusation, and he seems to have been more honest than many other men in similar positions of trust, he certainly took unsparingly. The wife of Joseph Kershaw, the patriot whom Cornwallis exiled to Bermuda, suffered for her husband's convictions. Kershaw had owned most of the mills around Camden, and much of the grain that went to them grew on his plantations. Stedman exhausted mills and plantations alike to feed the army. Although Mrs. Kershaw pleaded for some means of subsistence, Stedman disregarded her pitiful condition. By permitting cavalry and artillery horses to roam in grain too unripe for use, he dashed her hopes for future crops. He refused her new supplies of sugar and salt when she ran out of these commodities. Although she had formerly reimbursed her help and fed her Negroes from the cornmeal people paid her for the use of her mills, the commissaries denied her this toll. Toward the end of November her agent, Samuel Mathis, entreated Cornwallis for help. Mathis wrote one of Cornwallis' aides, Henry Haldane, that "whatever his lordship is willing to grant will be very thankfully receiv'd by Mrs. Kershaw." "We have no resources," Mathis concluded, "but in his lordship's bounty and your goodness."<sup>17</sup> Other pleas similar in nature reached Cornwallis during his winter at Winnsboro. Eventually he tried to combine duty with humanity. He did not stop the commissaries, indeed he could not, but he strictly reminded Stedman that the British did not make war on women and children. On the con-

trary, humanity commanded the British to support women and children of whatever political views. On December 15, he enjoined Stedman to "pay the most exact attention to leaving the proportion to the wives & children of the absentees whose estates are under sequestration."<sup>18</sup>

No matter how gently the Earl wished to treat suffering patriot families, he could not get away from the stubborn fact that his army had to eat. Had the British been able to gather supplies from the entire province instead of from just a small area and had the commissioner of sequestered estates been able to manage plantations and use them to grow foodstuffs for the British instead of taking from other people, the army would not have had to strip bare the surrounding countryside. Cornwallis would have marched after Greene with stronger, healthier troops, and he would have left Rawdon with a firm control of South Carolina.

In the previous autumn Cornwallis had formulated long-range plans to provide for such a happy state of affairs. He had appointed John Cruden commissioner of sequestered estates. But Cruden had discovered himself in difficulty from the first day in office. He had found the rebel plantations in his charge deserted, neglected, or ruined. Slaves, needed to harvest the crops, had disappeared or so lacked the necessities of life that they could not work. How could Cruden make the plantations pay? Only, he thought, by pouring money into them instead of taking it out. He needed food, clothes, tools, farm equipment, stock of every kind, draft horses, and money to pay for them. He needed to inoculate the plantation hands against smallpox which "raged in general over the country," and that, too, cost money. He required great numbers of overseers and an army of clerks to keep records. They, of course, wished to be paid for their labor. As a result not merely did Cruden prove unable to supply Camden, Winnsboro, Ninety-Six, or Charleston, he even proved unable to support his own department. He spent far

more than he took in, with no appreciable results. The horses supposed to fatten on the rich plantations never fattened, and the crops supposed to feed them and the British army never felt the harvester's sickle. The £50,000 to £60,000 supposed to accrue from the sale of the plantations' produce — tobacco, rice, indigo, wheat, peas, cattle, sheep — never materialized to fill British coffers.

Of course Cornwallis had anticipated little from Cruden in 1780, but he hoped that in 1781 the commissioner might feed the men who garrisoned South Carolina. Unfortunately, the year 1781 brought even greater trouble to Cruden than 1780. When the Earl left South Carolina, according to the commissioner, he left the field to the rebels. The frontiers became scenes of "confusion, robbery, and murder." Whigs destroyed plantations which might otherwise have produced in 1781, murdered overseers, razed houses, and slaughtered horses, cattle, and sheep. In addition, despite his increasingly slim resources, Cruden had to feed and maintain an ever-growing number of loyalists who fled from their homes to the shelter of the British army at Charleston. When the police board in the city finally examined Cruden's accounts in September of 1781, they found that the commissioner had expended £16,432 while he had collected only £9578.<sup>19</sup> Cornwallis could not have foreseen the ultimate difficulties to which Cruden would be reduced, but he certainly knew, before he left South Carolina, that the army had not solved its food problems.

Nor had it solved other problems of supply. There remained the difficulty of finding enough uniforms, ammunition, camp equipage, and especially rum, considered so necessary for the troops in the eighteenth century. Cornwallis did capture considerable supplies of arms, ammunition, and accoutrements. He did not capture rum or uniforms, and as winter deepened at Winnsboro, his need for both became desperate. Rum and uni-

forms came from New York to Charleston. From there they had to find their way into the interior. But the roads and waterways proved unsafe, and Cornwallis' men dressed in rags for winter's rains before a supply of uniforms managed to reach them.

At first Balfour tried to ship goods into the interior by wagon trains along the roads. But the limited supply of draft horses seriously handicapped this method of transportation. "It is impossible to send the whole way by land," Balfour wrote to Rawdon toward the end of October, "as it takes six weeks, and having only one sett of horses, they are totally knocked up by the journey."<sup>20</sup> Rebel depredations, furthermore, rendered the wagon route precarious. The "sending all the way to the army from Monk's corner by land," Balfour concluded in early November, "is now absolutely impracticable."<sup>21</sup> The waterways offered an alternative route since South Carolina boasts several large rivers, navigable for considerable distances into the interior. The Santee presented the most direct route to Cornwallis' forces, for it flowed from its headwaters in North Carolina (where it was called the Catawba) past Camden (where it had become the Wateree) down to the ocean between Charleston and Georgetown. About thirty miles south of Camden the Congaree River, which ran down from the interior west of Winnsboro, emptied into the Santee. Near the forks of the two streams, at McCord's Ferry, a good road went directly up to Camden. If the redcoats could secure the Santee as far as McCord's, Rawdon could send his wagons south to pick up army supplies and then distribute them to his garrison at Camden and to Cornwallis at Winnsboro.

Eventually Cornwallis and Balfour worked out this supply route. But it required large detachments to secure the river. "I cannot think," the Earl told Rawdon on November 10, "that the large cargo of rum & salt can come safe by the mouth of Santee. The navigation is very long, and cannot be protected by my floating force."<sup>22</sup> But on the very day he talked of insuper-

able obstacles Cornwallis exerted himself to overcome them. He dispatched Tarleton with a roving force south of Camden to protect the Santee supply route "so very essential to our existence."<sup>23</sup> A garrison at Georgetown covered the mouth of the river. Balfour, anticipating his commander's needs, dispatched the 64th regiment from Charleston to Kingstree Bridge on the Black River, almost midway between the mouth of the Santee and its fork with the Congaree,<sup>24</sup> to protect interior navigation. When goods for the provincials and the regulars finally arrived at Charleston in November,<sup>25</sup> Balfour rounded up all the boats he could find, sent them to the mouth of the Santee, and thence upriver to McCord's.<sup>26</sup>

They reached the army just in time. By the end of November the lieutenant general himself lacked even a greatcoat — a bath rug served as substitute — and the entire 71st regiment was "really quite naked."<sup>27</sup> December 9, however, saw the end of their worries. "Our clothing is all come up on every man & plenty of rum," he told Balfour on that day. Presumably there arrived also the seven cases of wine — claret was his favorite — which the commander in the South had ordered from London to warm his vitals for the rest of the drizzly winter.<sup>28</sup>

Victory in battle, however, required more than a well-fed, well-clothed army, although both those factors would help immeasurably. Victory required more even than the courage, stamina, and discipline which the redcoats possessed in abundance. Often victory required knowledge of the enemy's movements and intentions. A very important key to Cornwallis' past successes had been his superb intelligence system. Tarleton had surprised his enemies almost every time, and the Earl had managed to slip a spy into Gates' headquarters before the battle of Camden. Now the British intelligence system fell down so badly as to be not only worthless but also comical. "Our friends hereabouts are so timid and so stupid that I can get no intelligence,"

Cornwallis complained to Tarleton in the middle of December. The remark summed up his own experience of that winter<sup>29</sup> and Lord Rawdon's as well. "All my accounts about Smallwood [General William Smallwood] agree with yours," the Earl told Rawdon in November, "but mine are: 'I went as far as Fishing Creek, & there Billy McDaniel's wife told me that she saw Dicky Thomson who said he saw young Tommy Rigdom that just came from camps &c &c.' No offer can prevail upon any man I can find to go & see . . . with his own eyes."<sup>30</sup> Rawdon might well have sympathized with his commander's plight, for he too had to depend upon gossip, rumor, and women's wiles for his "intelligence." In late November Rawdon reported to his chief: "About an hour ago two of my spies came in. They had not been to the enemy's camp, but sent a woman thither, who returned to them yesterday morning reporting that she had left Gates & Smallwood at six mile run on Monday night. I am disposed to credit this intelligence."<sup>31</sup> "An emissary, upon whom I place much dependence," he wrote the Earl in December, "has this morning returned from the neighborhood of six mile run. He is too well known to have ventured into the enemy's camp. But he sent his niece thither, and her report I now transmit to your lordship."<sup>32</sup> All through November and December Cornwallis and his second depended upon hearsay of a similar nature for their knowledge of the enemy. As the time approached to move out of winter quarters, the Earl continued to receive the same sort of intelligence. Typical of his sources of information was David George, whose judgment can be gauged by his calling a man a rebel because he had stolen some rum, brandy, and horses from him. George told the following tale a week before the British army marched: "My wife's sister last night came to my house out of strong rebel settlement up at Prince's fort. By her I have heard the design & intention of the rebels." Such information might have been reliable had the wife gathered it herself, but she had depended upon others for what she pur-

veyed. "She understood," George continued, "from Captain Francis Prince's and Henry Prince's wives that they were awaiting for Colonel Morgan and Colonel Washington who was on their march to join them."<sup>33</sup>

Cornwallis did not require sophisticated intelligence during his inactivity in winter quarters. As the time approached to open a campaign in which he could anticipate major battles, however, intelligence became increasingly important. Yet he never seemed able to improve his service, despite all his efforts. He had ordered Leslie, who had landed in Charleston in December, to move his army into the interior and join his commander for the campaign in North Carolina. Yet inadequate intelligence would render the junction uncertain. When the time came, the Earl was unsure of where they should meet because he did not know the location of particular plantations and crossroads and could find no one who would point them out to him.<sup>34</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that during most of his North Carolina offensive in the spring of 1781, Cornwallis would have to move blindly. How indeed could he have expected it to be otherwise? Since even while at Winnsboro he gathered no reliable information from the many loyalists living in that vicinity under the protection of the British army, how could he hope to do better farther north in a country of fewer loyalists and to whom he could offer no permanent protection?

Possibly he thought that if he could maintain his full complement of regulars, he could defy all his unsolved problems of logistics. Regulars had taken Charleston. Regulars had thrashed Gates. Regulars almost always beat militia in open battle, no matter what the odds. Loyalists took heart at the sight of a regiment of redcoats — determined, disciplined, invincible. If Earl Cornwallis intended to take and hold North Carolina in the face of all obstacles, he needed full-strength regular regiments.

But could he depend upon having them? Numerous engagements in South Carolina had thinned his ranks. Reinforce-

ments, such as Leslie's, would make good some of the losses. In the Carolinas, however, sickness incapacitated as many men as bullets did, and it sometimes kept them away from the line longer. Sickness had attacked his army during the summer of 1780, and continued to shorten the muster rolls from then on. In July of 1780 Balfour at Ninety-Six worried that his command was "turning sickly fast."<sup>35</sup> Major Weymss reported from Georgetown in August that "within three days 6 men have died of putrid fevers. 4 Sergeants and 28 men are now ill."<sup>36</sup> When in August Cornwallis came to challenge Gates at Camden, illness kept eight hundred fifty-nine men, more than a battalion, from action. Later the situation worsened. Sickness delayed the march to Charlotte. "But we must get healthier," the Earl wrote to Balfour the week after he left Camden, "or there is no doing anything. I find the ague and fever all over this country, full as much as at Camden. They say go 40 or 50 miles farther & you will be healthy. It was the same language before we left Camden. There is no trusting such dangerous experiments." The entire 63d regiment fell so ill as to be "unfit for any active service."<sup>37</sup> Within another week the 71st was reduced to a similar state and Cornwallis had to bivouac for several days before continuing. He had one hundred twenty sick, their numbers increased daily, and he lacked sufficient wagons to transport them back to Camden.<sup>38</sup> He eventually resumed his march, but himself fell ill at Charlotte and had to suffer through the jolting wagon ride back to Winnsboro.

At Winnsboro he surely anticipated that illness might strike him again after he started moving north, even though the "sickly" seasons of summer and autumn had given way to winter. He knew also that battle would take its inevitable toll. Both wounded and sick were bound to increase greatly when he next took the field.

Sickness and wounds were, of course, the hazards of war. A general could not abandon his plans for a campaign because some men might become disabled. Cornwallis might well have

considered, however, the hazards of campaigning without adequate means of returning the disabled to duty quickly. He would need every man, which meant he would need the best of medical facilities. But the winter at Winnsboro had just shown that he could not even count upon having adequate medical facilities. At best the army had only crude medical understanding; doctors still bled men dying from loss of blood, dirty fingernails inoculated against smallpox, and filthy rags served to clean instruments.

Bad as their methods were, the doctors were still generally preferable to no doctors. The Earl, however, never had enough doctors or elementary medical supplies. The shortage of medical help became apparent at the siege of Charleston, and continued to trouble the army all through 1780. "The situation of the mates of the general hospital is really pitiable," Dr. John McNamara Hayes, chief physician at Charleston, wrote in April. "They are not allowed a servant, as every other part of the army, nor when they get one, are they allowed provisions to support him. At a time their services are wanted, they are employed in their domestic concerns, nor can I with justice condemn them."<sup>39</sup> The situation had grown still worse when the Earl examined the Charleston hospital in the middle of July. He discovered "a most alarming deficiency of medicine, and a want of medical assistance, and of stores."<sup>40</sup> Although he asked Clinton for medical supplies, the commander in chief never sent them. By November the medical arrangements had deteriorated even further. "We have recd no stores from New York," Hayes told Cornwallis, "nor have the surgeon & mates required been sent. Our mates here have been all ill, and some so far reduced as to render a visit to Europe necessary to supply their places."<sup>41</sup> Charleston, nonetheless, possessed the best medical facilities for the British army in South Carolina. The Earl often shipped his sick down to the city because Hayes cured them and returned them to duty more quickly than did his own physicians.

If the problem of sickness assumed enormous proportions for a stationary army, would it not overwhelm the lieutenant general during a campaign to the north, when Charleston would be beyond the reach of his sick and when he would have few qualified men and fewer medical supplies for treating the disabled on the spot?

With all the problems he faced, could he, in fact, afford to move into North Carolina at all? Congress was reorganizing the shattered American army in the South. Thus if he moved north he would face not only larger numbers of Continentals but also better generals than he had faced before. Nathanael Greene had replaced Gates, and Daniel Morgan, whose fierce riflemen had tormented Burgoyne at Saratoga, served under Greene. Would the Earl's army be in shape to face them? It had never suppressed patriot activity, even in the halcyon days after Camden. The once-active loyalists had melted away after King's Mountain. Could he ever feed himself on the march, when only the gigantic and ruthless efforts of Commissary Stedman had kept him alive at Winnsboro? Would he be able to replace the clothes, arms, ammunition, salt, rum, medicines, and other provisions that a northern campaign would consume, when Balfour at Charleston had been unable to forward any more than the bare necessities to him at Winnsboro? North Carolina's rivers would present obstacles to cross rather than highways of transportation. Once he crossed those obstacles would he know where to find his enemy? Could he ascertain the enemy's troop strength and disposition in a country dominated by whigs, when he had been unable to secure such information in a more loyal province from people to whom he could promise and give protection? Lastly, did he really expect that North Carolina would be kinder to the health of his troops than South Carolina? If not, could he hope to cure his sick during a winter offensive, when he had not been able to cure them in winter quarters? These were weighty considerations indeed.

The Earl thought about them during his winter at Winns-

boro, and thought about them deeply. Yet when the time for decision drew near, when action beckoned on the horizon and victory just beyond it, Cornwallis did not hesitate. Clinton would have hesitated — indeed, would probably have remained in South Carolina. Not Cornwallis. He weighed his obstacles against his possible gains and determined to move north. He would smash Greene.

## CHAPTER 12

*Cowpens*  
*“The Late Affair*  
*has almost Broke my Heart”*

SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS shaped his decision to pursue Greene early in January of 1781. First he had to think of Britain’s friends to the north. True, bitter experience in South Carolina had moved him to term loyalist militia “dastardly” and “pusillanimous.” But the loyalists in North Carolina had in the past shown their zeal and activity on some occasions — albeit prematurely and sometimes against Cornwallis’ own express instructions. Furthermore, the loyalists’ unreliability in combat did not necessarily rule out their usefulness in nonmilitary capacities: the offering of provisions, intelligence, guides, civil government, among the most important. The loyalists in North Carolina had originally been very numerous, more numerous, Stedman believed, than in any other colony.<sup>1</sup> But, dispersed throughout a thinly populated colony and “mixed in every district with people of opposite principles” who had “possessed themselves of the powers of government,” they were, Cornwallis knew, at a great disadvantage. Their attempts to manifest their loyalty had often brought “fatal consequences” to themselves and their cause.<sup>2</sup> They and their families often suffered much, and the Earl felt deeply for the cruelties inflicted upon them by



34. Mackenzie, *Strictures*, pp. 57-60.
35. Cornwallis to the Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, Dec. 12, 1788: *Cornwallis Corr.*, I, 316.
36. Cornwallis to Ferguson, Oct. 6, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/81, f. 23.

### Chapter II

(pages 230-248)

1. Cornwallis to Rawdon, Nov. 18, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/82, ff. 61-62.
2. See Cornwallis to Major England, Sept. 20, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/80, ff. 31-32; Cornwallis to Balfour, Aug. 31, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/79, ff. 47-48; Turnbull to Cornwallis, Nov. 8, 1780; Balfour to Cornwallis, Nov. 5, 1780; and A. Knecht to Cornwallis, Nov. 24, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/4, ff. 27-34, 61, and 198-199.
3. Cornwallis to Tarleton, Jan. 7, 1781: P.R.O. 30/11/64, ff. 29-30.
4. Cornwallis to Balfour, June 20, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/77, ff. 16-17.
5. We are indebted for much of our knowledge of the wagon service to Professor Arthur Bowler, Department of History, University of Buffalo. See also the "Seventh Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Examine, Take, and State, the Public Accounts of the Kingdom," *Journals of the House of Commons*, XXXVIII (1803), 1069.
6. "We get plenty of good strong draft horses for ten or twelve pounds apiece, but mostly under ten," Cornwallis noted in November. "Now as government is charged fifteen I cannot help thinking there is still a fair profit left. Besides that, I cannot think Britain engaged in this war merely for the enrichment of the Qr. Mr. Genl." The Earl also refused to grant a warrant of 451 guineas to one captain in the department who had used up £2000 of the army's money with few measurable benefits to the army. See Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 16, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/82, ff. 46-47; and Cornwallis to Major England, June 20, 1781: P.R.O. 30/11/87, ff. 11-12.
7. "You will hardly believe," Cornwallis declared to Balfour ten days following the Camden victory, "that after all our successes the Qr. Mr. Genl. can furnish only 26 teams, which he calls fit for service, except those attach'd to the regiments." See Cornwallis to Balfour, Aug. 29, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/79, ff. 45-46.
8. Stedman, *History of the American War*, II, 249.
9. Cornwallis to Balfour, Sept. 3, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/80, ff. 1-4.
10. Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 10, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/82, ff. 18-19.

11. "Seventh Report of the Commissioners," *Commons Journals*, XXXVIII, Appendix 33, p. 1109.
12. Cornwallis to Tarleton, Jan. 7, 1781: P.R.O. 30/11/84, ff. 29-30.
13. Cornwallis to Balfour, Jan. 7, 1781: *ibid.*, ff. 25-26.
14. He testified against the abuses of this department in 1782 before the parliamentary commissioners investigating the department.
15. Stedman, *History of the American War*, II, 228n, 229n.
16. *Ibid.*, 354n, 355n.
17. Samuel Mathis to Henry Haldane, Nov. 21, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/71, ff. 9-10.
18. Cornwallis to Stedman, Dec. 15, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/83, ff. 46-47.
19. P.R.O. 30/11/110, ff. 4b-10 records Cruden's long and painful story. It contains his narrative before the board of police and the decisions of that body in 1781 and 1782. See also P.R.O. 30/11/7, ff. 8-19, "Copies of letters, from Earl Cornwallis, Lord Rawdon and others, likewise of a memorial, letters &c respecting the business of the sequestered property as well real as personal &c &c &c."
20. Balfour to Rawdon, Oct. 20, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/3, ff. 289-290.
21. Balfour to Cornwallis, Nov. 5, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/4, ff. 27-34.
22. Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 10, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/82, ff. 18-19.
23. Cornwallis to Tarleton, Nov. 10, 1780: *ibid.*, ff. 20-21.
24. Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 17, 1780: *ibid.*, ff. 55-56.
25. See "Abstract of Cloathing received from New York by the Three Brothers Store Ship, Captain Lock, for the use of his Majesty's Provincial Forces in Carolina," Charleston, Nov. 30, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/103, f. 11; and "Invoice of Camp Equipage &c Shipped on board the Brigg Experiment . . .," *ibid.*, f. 8.
26. See Balfour to Cornwallis, Nov. 5, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/4, ff. 27-34. Several letters in the Cornwallis Papers relate to this supply route. See, for example, Rawdon to Cornwallis, Nov. 16, 1780, and Balfour to Cornwallis, Nov. 3, 1780: *ibid.*, ff. 139-140, 252-253.
27. Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 27, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/82, ff. 111-112.
28. See Cornwallis to Rawdon, Nov. 28, Dec. 1, Dec. 3, and to Balfour, Dec. 9, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/82, ff. 119-120; P.R.O. 30/11/83, ff. 1-3, 7-8, and 31-32.
29. Cornwallis to Tarleton, Dec. 18, 1780: *Cornwallis Corr.*, I, 74.
30. Cornwallis to Rawdon, Nov. 16, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/82, ff. 53-54.
31. Rawdon to Cornwallis, Nov. 29, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/4, ff. 234-235.
32. Rawdon to Cornwallis, December, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/66, ff. 25-26.

33. David George to Cornwallis, Dec. 30, 1780: *ibid.*, ff. 44-45.
34. Cornwallis to Leslie, Jan. 14, 1781: P.R.O. 30/11/84, ff. 59-60.
35. Balfour to Cornwallis, July 17, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/2, ff. 317-318.
36. Weymss to Cornwallis, Aug. 4, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/63, ff. 17-18.
37. Cornwallis to Balfour, Sept. 13, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/80, ff. 20-21.
38. Cornwallis to Major England, Sept. 20, 1780: *ibid.*, ff. 31-32.
39. Hayes to John André, Apr. 13, 1780: Clinton Papers.
40. Cornwallis to Clinton, July 16, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/72, f. 32.
41. Hayes to Cornwallis, Nov. 5, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/4, ff. 134-135.

## Chapter 12

(pages 249-273)

1. Stedman, *History of the American War*, II, 369.
2. Cornwallis to Sir James Wright, Bart., President, and the members of the board of agents for the American Loyalists: P.R.O. 30/11/94, ff. 9-10.
3. Only after his arrival upon the spot—for a longer period than the brief experience at Charlotte—did he reluctantly conclude that the long series of oppressions and persecutions had finally broken the spirits of the loyalists before the British appeared in North Carolina. "We had been too sanguine on both sides," he would later explain, "for expectations had been too high of cooperation & assistance, and our friends had expected too much from the appearance of a British army in the Province." See Cornwallis to Wright: P.R.O. 30/11/94, ff. 9-10.
4. Colonel Charles O'Hara to the Duke of Grafton, Apr. 20, 1781: Grafton Papers Ac. 423/191, Bury Record Office, Bury St. Edmunds.
5. For details of Greene's life see Thayer, *Greene*.
6. Quoted without footnote in Burke Davis, *The Cowpens-Guilford Court-house Campaign* (Philadelphia and New York, 1962), p. 69.
7. Stedman, *History of the American War*, II, 353.
8. *Ibid.* gives these figures. Theodore Thayer, *Nathanael Greene, Strategist of the American Revolution* (New York, 1960), p. 297, credits Morgan with 620 men. See also Don Higginbotham, *Daniel Morgan, Revolutionary Rifleman* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1961). Chapter VIII details Morgan's activities before the battle of Cowpens.
9. "State of the Troops left in South Carolina under the Command of the Right Honorable Colonel Lord Rawdon," Jan. 15, 1781: P.R.O.

- 30/11/103, f. 16. Of these almost half were provincials, the rest British and Germans.
10. Balfour to Lt. Col. George Campbell, Jan. 25, 1781: P.R.O. 30/11/109, ff. 5-6.
11. Cornwallis to Balfour, Jan. 1, 1781: P.R.O. 30/11/84, ff. 1-2. See also Cornwallis to Rawdon, same date: *ibid.*, ff. 3-4.
12. Actually Lt. Col. Robert Gray of the Cheraw militia had suggested the expedition to Cape Fear at the end of September, 1780. Gray reasoned that the British could never form an effective loyalist militia in the Cheraw area unless redcoats held the Cape Fear. Although Cornwallis by 1781 worried more about getting supplies than about getting loyalist help, Craig's expedition would hopefully answer both needs. See Robert Gray to Cornwallis, Sept. 30, 1780: P.R.O. 30/11/64, ff. 130-131.
13. For Arnold's account of his activities see P.R.O. 30/11/99, ff. 23-26.
14. The British regulars included: the elite Brigade of Guards (690); the 7th regiment (167); the 3d Company of the 16th regiment (41), the 23d regiment (286); the 33d regiment (286), the 1st battalion of the 71st regiment (249), the 2d battalion of the 71st (237), and the light company of the 71st (69). See "State of the Troops that marched with the Army under the Command of Lieut. General Earl Cornwallis": P.R.O. 30/11/5, f. 134. The figures quoted are rank and file present and fit for duty on Jan. 15, 1781. Leslie's men, who are included in the return, had not yet joined Cornwallis. Leslie brought the Guards, Bose, Jagers, some light horse, the North Carolina Regiment of Volunteers, and two pieces of artillery. See A. R. Newsome, ed., "A British Orderly Book, 1780-1781," *North Carolina Historical Review*, IX (1932), pp. 180, 278. As Leslie marched to meet him, Cornwallis made some alterations in the major general's forces, ordering Leslie to leave some units with Rawdon and to bring other forces from Rawdon's command.
15. Cornwallis to Rawdon, Dec. 30, 1780: *Cornwallis Corr.*, I, 77. Cornwallis said that the report "frightened" him, for if true, it "would greatly embarrass our operations, and engage us in a naval expedition, which I fear we are but ill prepared for."
16. Cornwallis to Rawdon, Jan. 1, 1781: P.R.O. 30/11/84, ff. 3-4. Greene knew, of course, that Cornwallis planned to march north and that he only awaited the junction with Leslie's reinforcements before moving. But Camden lies east of the direct route from Charleston (where Leslie had landed his men) to Winnsboro. Thus by ordering Leslie to Camden, Cornwallis "rendered precarious any calculations Greene might make as